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COMMERCE IN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: 
A RESPONSE TO JACK BALKIN 
Robert G. Natelson* and David Kopel**†
Guest (tied and trussed): You said you were having me over for dinner. 
You didn’t say that I was the dinner. 
 
Host: Right. I said I was having you over for dinner. Obviously, you didn’t 
consider all the possible meanings of my words. 
* * * * 
No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers 
labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. 
—James Madison, reacting to claims 
of congressional omnipotence.1
The Constitution’s original meaning is its meaning to those ratifying the 
document during a discrete time period: from its adoption by the Constitu-
tional Convention in late 1787 until Rhode Island’s ratification on May 29, 
1790.
 
2 Reconstructing it requires historical skills, including a comprehen-
sive approach to sources. Jack Balkin’s article Commerce3
In his first sentence, Balkin reveals the principal reason for his error: “A 
good test for the plausibility of any theory of constitutional interpretation,” 
he writes, “is how well it handles the doctrinal transformations of the New 
Deal period.”
 fails to consider 
the full range of evidence and thereby attributes to the Constitution’s Com-
merce Clause a scope that virtually no one in the Founding Era believed it 
had. 
4
                                                                                                                      
 * Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, Independence Institute; Professor of Law 
(ret.), University of Montana. 
 Otherwise, “we could not have a federal government that 
provides all of the social services and statutory rights guarantees that Amer-
 ** Research Director, Independence Institute; Adjunct Professor of Advanced Constitutional 
Law, Denver University, Sturm College of Law. 
 † Suggested citation: Robert G. Natelson & David Kopel, Commentary, Commerce in the 
Commerce Clause: A Response to Jack Balkin, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 55 (2010), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/natelsonkopel.pdf. 
 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison). 
 2. Evidence from shortly after ratification may be useful for shining a light back to the 
period before May 29, 1790. Such evidence must be used with great caution, however, because once 
the Constitution was ratified by the requisite number of states, advocates of vast federal power had 
much less incentive against making the kind of broad claims that might have led to the Constitu-
tion’s rejection during the ratification debate. 
 3. Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 4. Id. at 2. 
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icans have come to expect. The government could neither act to protect the 
environment nor rescue the national economy in times of crisis.” 
No. The original meaning of the Constitution does not depend on 
whether it comports with Jack Balkin’s policy preferences on the welfare 
state any more than whether it comports with John Yoo’s policy preferences 
on habeas corpus or John McCain’s policy preferences on campaign speech. 
Balkin’s piece suffers from the vice he attributes to others: “view[ing] the 
commerce power through modern eyes.” 
The foundation of Balkin’s thesis is that during the Founding Era, the 
word “commerce” sometimes included not only mercantile trade and certain 
incidents, but other social relationships as well. We agree. However, we dis-
pute Balkin’s claim that “commerce” in the Commerce Clause also includes 
those other relationships. 
During the Founding Era, the meaning of a word in a legal document 
was presumed to be its ordinary, common meaning.5
This is clear from a more complete survey of the contemporaneous dic-
tionaries than Balkin produces. He goes no further than an entry for 
“commerce” in a 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary. That entry 
begins with the word “intercourse” and references religious and social deno-
tations. Balkin seems unaware that relying exclusively on Johnson’s Dictio-
nary can be risky: while deservedly celebrated, Johnson’s work is 
sometimes idiosyncratic, and its compiler’s zest for comprehensiveness can 
mislead. Many of Johnson’s examples were seldom-used archaisms from 
long-dead writers like Richard Hooker and William Shakespeare. Indeed, 
the mere fact that this edition’s first example of “commerce” was the inte-
raction between God and humans (from Hooker) should raise doubts, since 
during the ratification debates the Federalists specifically denied that Con-
gress would have power to regulate religious relationships. 
 There is little question 
that the ordinary and common meaning of “commerce,” both in common 
discourse and in legal language, was mercantile trade and traditionally asso-
ciated activities. The social, religious, and sexual meanings of “commerce,” 
while sometimes employed, were figurative or metaphorical, derived from 
the mercantile meaning. 
In fact, there were many editions of Johnson’s Dictionary, and not all 
included the subsidiary definitions Balkin relies on. The first edition, in 
1756, and the eighth, published in 1786 (the year before the ratification 
process began), included only a mercantile definition of the noun “com-
merce”: “Exchange of one thing for another; trade; traffick.” Nor was 
Johnson’s the only Founding Era dictionary. The dictionaries by Sheridan 
and Donaldson limited their definitions to the mercantile meaning.6
                                                                                                                      
 5. TIMOTHY BRANCH, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATIS 73 (1753) (reporting the maxim Nun-
quam decurritur ad extraordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium, or “Resort is never made to the 
extraordinary but when the ordinary fails”). 
 Those 
 6. THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1789) 
(unpaginated) (defining “commerce” as “Exchange of one thing for another, trade, traffick”); 
ALEXANDER DONALDSON, A UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1763) (unpagi-
nated) (same definition). 
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of Allen, Ash, and Bailey included the social definition, but relegated it to 
secondary importance.7 Barlow’s dictionary acknowledged the social mean-
ing at the end of this entry on the subject, but described it as figurative.8
Another way to determine how the Constitution uses a word is to sample 
contemporaneous use directly. Professor Randy Barnett did so in two empir-
ical studies, one compiling dozens of references to “commerce” in the 
constitutional debates
  
Thus, a more complete survey of the dictionaries in use at the time of the 
Founding Era strongly suggests that the mercantile meaning of commerce 
was the most natural meaning in ordinary discourse, with the social and 
sexual denotations much less common. 
9 and the other cataloguing 1,594 appearances of the 
word in newspaper usage.10
Balkin also overlooks yet another potential source of meaning: the pre-
Revolutionary debate over the proper allocation of power between London 
and the colonies within the British Empire. The British government argued 
for unlimited parliamentary supremacy over the colonies. Most Americans 
conceded to London the regulation of commercial trade among units of the 
empire, but contended that other activities in America should be regulated 
only by colonial assemblies. The balance of power between the states and 
the federal government in the Constitution largely tracked the balance the 
Americans had sought within the British Empire.
 He found the mercantile meaning of commerce 
to be overwhelmingly dominant. Balkin regrettably does not consider those 
studies worth citation or rebuttal, although he does discuss another of Bar-
nett’s works. 
11
Just as telling as the dominant use of “commerce” in common speech is 
its dominant use in legal discourse. The Constitution was, after all, a legal 
document. It was drafted by a convention consisting primarily of lawyers 
and others knowledgeable in law, and was explained primarily by lawyers to 
 
                                                                                                                      
 7. FRANCES ALLEN, A COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1765) (unpaginated) (“[T]he exchange 
of commodities, or the buying and selling merchandize both at home and abroad; intercourse of any 
kind.”); 1 JOHN ASH,  THE NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775) (unpagi-
nated) (defining commerce as “the exchange of commodities, or the buying and selling merchandize 
both at home and abroad,” and adding as a second definition, “intercourse of any kind”); NATHANIEL 
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSITY ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY (1783) (unpaginated) (“[T]rade or traffick; also 
converse, correspondence.”). 
 8. 1 FREDERICK BARLOW,  THE COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, OR GENERAL REPOSITORY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1772–73) (adding, “[c]ommerce is used figuratively for intercourse, or 
connection of any kind” after giving a purely mercantile definition). 
 9. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 
(2001). 
 10. Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 
ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003). 
 11. Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of “Commerce” In the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 789, 836–39 (2006).  
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a public audience that, by comparison with today’s public, was superbly 
literate in legal matters.12
In 2006, one of us published a survey of the word “commerce” in An-
glo-American legal sources commonly consulted during the Founding Era.
 
13
Commerce, (Commercium) Traffick, Trade or Merchandise in Buying and 
Selling of Goods. See Merchant.  
 
Included in the sample were popular Founding Era treatises, digests, law 
dictionaries, and other legal materials. Also included were all English cases 
reported between about 1550 and 1799 and all American cases reported un-
til 1790. The cases alone provided over 470 references to “commerce” and 
its Latin analogue, commercium. The key finding was that lawyers used 
“commerce” almost exclusively in a mercantile sense—as the exchange of 
commodities, and  certain closely connected activities, such as navigation 
and commercial paper. Two definitions in the 1762 edition of Giles Jacob’s 
popular law dictionary (a frequent holding in American libraries) exemplify 
the legal usage: 
Merchant, (Mercator) is one that buys and trades in any Thing . . . But 
every one that buys and sells is not . . . a Merchant; only those who traf-
fick in the Way of Commerce . . . . Those that buy Goods, to reduce them 
by their own Art or Industry . . . are Artificers and not Merchants . . .14
Balkin does acknowledge this study in a footnote, but dismisses it by 
saying that the author “does not recognize that all of his examples are united 
by the general concept of ‘intercourse.’ ” Unfortunately, this response is 
simply inaccurate: the author does provide examples inconsistent with wider 
meaning, and indeed, offers them specifically to show their inconsistency.
 
15
Because of the legal nature of the Constitution, contemporaneous legal 
definitions, concepts, and doctrines can be key to understanding the original 
meaning. What the legal sources tell us about “regulating commerce” is that 
it was well understood as a bounded concept. It encompassed governmental 
trade restrictions, the law merchant, and certain closely related areas, such 
as navigation and commercial paper. Areas of law outside that realm were 
not part of “regulating commerce,” even if closely connected to commerce. 
One example was governance over the immigration and emigration of free 
persons, which Balkin several times erroneously attributes exclusively to the 
commerce power, but which the Constitution granted to Congress as part of 
 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare 
Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 247–48 (2007) (explain-
ing the high level of legal knowledge among the ratifying public). 
 13. Natelson, Commerce, supra note 11. 
 14. GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (1762) (unpaginated). 
 15. Natelson, Commerce, supra note 11, at 811–12. The study was directed at either validat-
ing or disproving a hypothesis that “commerce” included all gainful economic activity. In excluding 
that hypothesis, it necessarily excluded the even broader definition Balkin advocates. 
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its authority to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Na-
tions.”16
Balkin entirely fails to address a decisive historical fact: during the rati-
fication debates, the Constitution’s advocates repeatedly and clearly 
represented to the general public many areas over which the new govern-
ment would have no power at all, at least within state boundaries. Their lists 
included education, social services, real estate transactions, inheritance, re-
ligion, manufacturing, agriculture and other land use, business licensing, 
most road building, civil justice within states, local government, and control 
of personal property outside mercantile commerce. All of these are within 
Balkin’s broad definition of “commerce,” but control over all, the Federal-
ists informed the public, were outside federal authority. Those enumerations 
have been in the modern legal literature since one of us republished them in 
2003;
 
17 more have been added since.18
Balkin points out that “fidelity to original meaning does not require fi-
delity to the original expected applications of text and principle.” However, 
most of the Federalist representations about the limited scope of federal 
power were not merely statements of expectation. They were specific repre-
sentations of constitutional meaning. Moreover, although fidelity to original 
meaning does not always and invariably require honoring every expectation 
about how a power would be applied, expectations can be valuable evidence 
of underlying meaning. 
 
We have space only to address briefly a few of Balkin’s other points: 
The Indian Intercourse Act. Plentiful Founding-Era evidence, including 
enactments of the Confederation Congress and state legislatures, show that 
“Commerce with the Indian tribes” referred to mercantile trade with the In-
dians and certain tightly related activities, such as the licensing of and 
control over the behavior of merchants.19
Balkin enlists the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790 as exemplifying a 
broad meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause. Because the 1790 act in-
cluded some criminal provisions (as trade regulations often did), Balkin 
argues that the meaning of “commerce” extended far beyond trade. 
 
The Indian Intercourse Act was adopted after the Constitution had been 
ratified, and, like the Sedition Act a few years later, is not necessarily a cor-
rect guide to public understanding of the Constitution at the time of 
ratification. However, if the act had been adopted pursuant to the commerce 
power, and  before the holdouts of North Carolina and Rhode Island had 
ratified the Constitution, the act would help the Balkin thesis very little, for 
the law’s criminal provisions were typical of contemporaneous trade regula-
                                                                                                                      
 16. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 220–27 (Knud Haakonssen, ed. 2008) (origi-
nally published 1758) (discussing emigration and immigration as a division of international law).  
Vattel’s work was the most important book on international law during the Founding Era. 
 17. Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L. J. 469 (2003). 
 18. E.g., Natelson, supra note 11, at 840 n.252. 
 19. See generally, Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, 85 DENVER U.L. REV. 201 (2007). 
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tion—designed to protect trade by punishing merchants who entered Indian 
territory without authorization.20
In fact, however, the law was an exertion of the treaty power, not the 
commerce power. It was adopted on the recommendation of President 
Washington “for extending a trade to [the Indians] agreeably to the treaties 
of Hopewell.”
 
21 Several years ago, one of us discussed this background, 
including an explanation for why the law extended beyond the signatory 
tribes.22
James Wilson’s Statement. Balkin quotes James Wilson’s comment dur-
ing the ratification debates to the effect that the federal government would 
have power over matters that affected more than one state. In isolation, the 
statement appears more persuasive than it does in context. Not only were 
comments of that sort relatively rare, but they were contradicted by other 
Federalist representations—including representations from Wilson himself. 
Despite the statement Balkin cites, Wilson went out of his way to identify 
particular activities outside congressional control, even though they had 




Earlier Drafts of the Constitution. Although Balkin tries to attribute the 
broad power grants in an early draft of the Constitution to the enumeration 
in the final draft, the wording and approaches of the two drafts are very dif-
ferent. The change was made by the convention’s Committee of Detail, 
perhaps amid a general recognition that the ratifying public would never 
accept a national government with plenary powers—a recognition that 
proved prescient during the ratification process. 
 Wilson surely knew that newspapers exercised interstate influence and 
that papers in one state often printed stories from papers in other states. The 
interstate exchange of ideas via the press is certainly a form of intercourse. 
Yet Wilson argued strongly that the federal government would have no 
power over the subject, even though the First Amendment did not yet exist. 
It is not quite true, as Balkin argues, that no one objected to the change, 
for later in the convention several delegates assayed to strengthen congres-
sional power.24
                                                                                                                      
 20. Id. at 253–54. 
 
 21. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 68 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 22. On the latter point, see Natelson, supra note 19, at 255–56 (explaining that the Hopewell 
treaties were the first in a series of treaties which were being negotiated with a variety of tribes). 
 23. E.g., 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 449 (2d ed. 1836). Elliot quoted Wilson as stating, at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, “on the subject of the press . . . this Constitution says nothing 
with regard to that subject, nor was it necessary; because it will be found that there is given to the 
general government no power whatsoever concerning it; and no law, in pursuance of the Constitu-
tion, can possibly be enacted to destroy that liberty” Wilson’s comment came, of course, prior to 
adoption of the First Amendment. 
 24. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 324–33 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(recording debate at the constitutional convention over adding further powers for Congress). Bal-
kin’s argument that the final draft should be presumed to mean the same as the earlier drafts runs 
contrary to a rule of statutory construction that is also sensible in constitutional construction: “[f]ew 
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not 
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Interdependence or Lack Thereof. Finally, one should not assume that 
the founders limited federal power because they believed activities reserved 
for state regulation did not affect other states. They well understood that 
such activities could affect other states; this is one reason they permitted 
states to compact with each other with congressional consent.25 But as the 
ratification record makes abundantly clear, the founders ultimately decided 
to sacrifice comprehensiveness for freedom: for them, a purpose more im-
portant than maximizing the efficiency of a central government was 
minimizing the risk of tyranny.26
Many today would not make the same choice regarding the scope of the 
federal government’s power. But the constitution they might write for us is 
not the same as the Constitution bequeathed by the founders. 
 
                                                                                                                      
intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other lan-
guage.’ ” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442 (1987). 
 25. U.S. CONST., art. I, §10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter 
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . .”). 
Another illustration of both the Founders’ relatively narrower interpretation of “commerce” 
and their understanding of how it affected other activities is this passage from a 1784 congressional 
committee report: “The fortune of every Citizen is interested in the fate of commerce: for it is the 
constant source of industry and wealth; and the value of our produce and our land must ever rise or 
fall in proportion to the prosperous or adverse state of trade.”  26 J. CONT. CONG. 269 (April 22, 
1784).  Note the identification of “commerce” with “trade” and how other activities affected by it 
are identified separately.  The committee members were Elbridge Gerry, Jacob Read, Hugh Wil-
liamson, Jeremiah Townley Chase, and Thomas Jefferson. 
 26. Cf. Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
531, 565 (1998) (“The accountability provisions do not establish a preference-maximizing constitu-
tion. They create a tyranny-minimizing constitution.”). 
